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1. SUMMARY: Petrs contends that cert should be granted to resolv~ 
a split in the CA's on the circumstances under which determinations of 
state~ dministrative bodies may be- gi~ en-Fclu~ v~ ef~ in Title ____ ___________,_ ---
VII and civil rights claims in federal courts. 
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18, 1981, the Dean of the Service advised resp that he was to be ter-
minated from his job due to inadequate work performance. On December 
22, resp filed an administrative appeal from the Notice of Pending 
Termination under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. 
On January 5, 1982, resp filed his federal complaint that forms the 
basis of the present petition. 
Resp's complaint alleged that in the past he had reported to Uni-
versity of ~ennessee officials instances . of racial discrimination in 
the treatment of black leader s, students, and staff personnel in con-
nection with 4-H club events. One of resp's major complaints was a 
> 
racial slur made by petr Coley, a Service livestock judge, at an offi-
cial Service event. The complaint alleged that following resp's com-
plaint regarding the incident, petrs Downen, Luck, and Shearon (Uni-
versity officials) conspired with several other petrs to have resp 
terminated from his job. The complaint further alleged that petrs 
A 
conspired to have the Agricultural Extension Service Committee in the 
county in which r€sp was employed recommend resp's removal. The com-
plaint finally alleged a number of other specific incidents of racial 
prejudice. The~ complaint sought class certification, an injunction 
' , 
restraining petrs from continuing the discriminatory practices, a per-
manent injunction requiring petrs to cease attempting to discharge 
resp, and attorneys' fees and one million dollars in damages. Claims 
were asserted under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 2000d & 
e and under the First, · Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
On January 19, 1982, the DC entered a temporary restraining order 
\ 
prohibiting petrs from taking any personnel action against resp. On 
February 23, the court withdrew the restraining order to permit the 
_,, 
• 
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parties to proceed through the f tate administrative review proces q . 
The relevant provisions of the Tennessee Code governing this process 
provide for determination of the issues by an administrative judge 
("AJ") who must be an employee of the affected agency or of the office 
of the secretary of state. A number of procedural rights are afforded 
at the hearing, including the right to be represented by counsel: the 
right to file pleadings, motions, briefs, and proposed findings of 
fact and law; and the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses. 
The administrative judge is bound by the civil rules of evidence ex-
cept that evidence otherwise not admissible may be relied upon if it 
is "of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent [people] in 
the conduct of their affairs." Appeal of a decision is first to the 
agency and then to the state chancery court within sixty days of entry 
of the agency's order. 
The )r:nistrative judge ("Ad conducted a lengthy hearing dur-
ing which resp's counsel examined nearly one hundred witnesses. The 
£ 
University alleged eight separate i·nstances of poor job performance~~ 
and sought approval of its decision to dismiss resp. Resp defended a-{/ 
--- ~ 
against the charges by asserting, inter alia, that the accusations ~ 
Tl}_e AJ, issued a ~ er uph~ against him were racially motivated. 
four of the eight charges -but denying approval of the dismissal. In-
stead, the AJ directed that resp retain his position and be trans-
ferred to another count~. The AJ aiso concluded that he had no juris-
diction to hear resp'$ c'laims of c1vil rights violations. Neverthe-
less, he considered the cl~ims as "affirmative defenses" to the Uni-
versity's charges and found that "the employer's action in bringing 
the charges ... [was] based on what it ... perceived as impro_per ---
- - 4 -
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and/or inadequate behavior and inadequ{ te job performance rather than 
racial discrimination. I therefore conclude that employee has failed 
in his burden of proof to the claim of racial discriminatiQn as a de-
'----- ----- -~ -----~ --- -------- -
fense to the charges against him." / Resp appealled to the University ----· -------
of Tennessee Vice President for Agriculture, who affirmed the AJ's 
decision. 
Eig~ ty-four day s later, resp renewed action on his pending feder-
al complaint, requesting a restraining order forbidding his transfer 
because the "decision of the [AJ] and the agency constituted an abuse 
of discretion, is contrary to law, and is not supported by reliable, 
probative and substantial evidence." Moreover, resp argued that only 
federal courts can exercise "the Article III powers which are pecu-
liarly applicable to [his constitutional and civil rights] claims." 
• Petr University responded that the DC lacked jurisdiction to "review 
the merits" of the final agency order because by state statute review 
may be had only in the Tennessee chancery courts and only on timely 
I 
petition for review. The University also contended that principles of 
res judicata prevented "relitigation" of the claims of racial dis-
crimination in federal court. The DC granted summary judgment to all 
petrs on these grounds. 
The CA6 reversed. Resp did not invoke the court's jurisdiction ---under the administrative review provisions of the Tennessee Code. 
Rather he relied under 28 u.s.c § 1331 and 1343. With respect to the 
res judicata argument, the CA6 <livided its discussion into two-parts: 
res judicata with respect to the Title VII claim and res judicata with 
respect to the constitutional and civil rights claims. On the Title 
VII claims, the court concluded that Kremer v. Chemical Construction 
- - 5 - -
Co., 456 U.S. 461, 469-470 & n.7 (1982), required de novo review in 
federal courts. The Kremer ~ourt's citation of United States v. Utah 
Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (holding that res 
judicata principles apply to the decision of an administrative agency 
acting in "a judicial capacity") (cited in Kremer at 456 U.S., at 484 
n.26), did not change this conclusion. ~hat citation was in the mid-
dle of discussion of an administrative decision that had been reviewed 
in state court, in contrast to the unreviewed administrative decision 
discussed in footnote 7. 
The CA6 found the constitutional and civil rights claims to pose 
'---
more difficult~~ The court noted that neither Allen v. 
Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) nor Migra v. Warren City School District 
Board of Education, 104 S.Ct. 892 (1984), required that preclusive 
effect be given to unreviewed findings of a state administrative agen-
cy (as opposed to a state court). The conflict between §1983 and 28 
u.s.c. §17381 that the Court resolved in Allen and Migra is not 
present here since §1738 by its terms applies only to court proceed-
ings. The legislative history of §1983 implicitly recognizes that 
state determination of issues relevant to constitutional adjudication 
is not an adequate substitute for full access to federal court. A 
rule denying preclusive effect to unreviewed state administrative de-
1 Section 1738 implements the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the Constitution, Art. IV Sl, and provides that "Acts, records 
and judicial proceedings [of every state] ..• shall have the same 
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and 
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in 
the courts of such State, Territory, or Possession from which 
they are taken." 
- - 6 - -
terminations in a subsection §1983 action also has the salutary effect 
of preserving congruence between the rules of preclusion in Title VII 
actions and §1983 actions. "Application of preclusion as to part of 
the case saves no effort, does not prevent the risk of inconsistent 
findings, and may distort the process of finding the issues." 18 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4471 at 
169 (Supp.? 5). 
T,J/cA6 finally stated that 
[t]he decision we reach today is at odds ith the re-
sult reached in other circuits; t e existing ple hora 
of v i ews-en--t-h-e-t-5-suernal<e-s-- con f 1 i c t in e v i tab 1 e . See , 
e.g., Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old 
Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 46 (CA2 1985) (giving preclu-
sive effect to a state administrative determination on 
authority of Utah Construction); Gargiul v. Tompkins, 
704 F.2d 661, 667 (CA2 1983) (not giving preclus1ve 
effect to a state administrative determination because 
the claimant had not "cross[ed] the line between state 
agency and state judiciary proceedings", ••• vacated 
on other grounds, 104 S.Ct. 1263), on remand, 739 F.2d 
34 (1984); Moore v. Bonner, 695 F.2d 799, 801-802 (CA4 
1982) (not giving preclusive effect to state adminis-
trative determination because contrary rule would en-
courage claimants to bypass agency remedies); Steffen 
v. Housewright, 665 F.2d 245, 247 (CA8 1981) (per 
cur1am) (purporting to give preclusive effect to state 
administrative determination, but holding that agen-
cy's findings may be disregarded if they are "clearly 
erroneous"); Patsy v. Florida International Univ., 634 
F.2d 900, 910 (CA5 1981) (en bane) (stating that state 
administrative determinations "carry no res judicata 
or collateral estoppel baggage into federal court"), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Re-
gents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 
300, 306 n.3 (CA4 1980) (per curiam) (not giving pre-
elusive effect to a state administrative determination 
because of the "deliberately intended political compo-
sition of the tribunal"); Tailor v. New York City 
Transit Authority, 433 F.2d65, 670-671 (CA2 1970) 
(giving preclusive effect to state administrative de-
termination on authority of workers' compensation 
cases decided on the basis of full faith and credit 
clause). App. at A24-A25 (footnote omitted). 
• 
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The CA6, however, believed that its resolution of the case was the 
most faithful to this Court's precedents. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that in United States v. Utah Con-
struction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), this Court held that tra-
ditional principles of res judicata are applicable to administrative 
proceedings "[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial 
capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which 
the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate." The CA6 
distinguished Utah Construction on the grounds that it involved a fed-
eral agency instead of a state agency, but that is a distinction with-
out a difference. Kremer did not overrule Utah Construction; indeed, 
the Kremer opinion discussed the Utah Construction case approvingly. 
The CA6 also refused to follow this Court's decisions in Allen and 
Migra, which both recognize that traditional doctrines of issue pre-
clusion apply to §1983 actions. 
The CA6 acknowledged that its q~cision conflicted with that of 
other circuits. In addition to the cases cited by the CA6, see above, 
the decision also directly conflicts with Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola 
General Bottlers, Inc., 768 F.2d 842 (CA7 1985) (res judicata applies 
to Title VII and §1983 claims previously litigated before Illinois 
Human Rights Commission) (decided shortly after the CA6's decision 
here) and with O'Hara v. Board of Education, 590 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 
1984) (New Jersey ALJ's decision given preclusive effect in Title VII 
case), aff'd mem., 760 F.2d 259 (CA3 1985). The debate over the issue 
has become particularly intense since this Court's 1982 Kremer deci-
sion, with much of the debate centering on inferences to be drawn from 
- - 8 - -
footnotes 7 and 26 of that opinion. ~he exiting conflict will not 
abate in the absence of a decision by this Court. 
Many states have enacted administrative procedure acts which are 
similar to the one involved in this case. See K. Davis, Administra-
tive Law Treatise §1:10 (1983). Therefore the CA6's decision here 
calls into serious question the validity of the modern model of admin-
istrative procedure as a mechanism for resolution of disputes. 
Resp answers that the CA6's decision does not conflict with Allen 
or Migra because those decisions involved the preclusive effect of 
state court decisions on subsequent federal court proceedings. In-
stead, the CA6 correctly followed the controlling decision of Kremer. 
Moreover, the decision below comports with the principles announced in 
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) and Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), which emphasize the importance of federal 
court resolution of matters relating to employment discrimination. 
Resp also contends that the circuit split raised by petrs and the 
CA6 is illusory. With respect to preclusion in Title VII cases, the 
CA3's decision in O'Hara v. Board of Education, affirming without 
opinion a DC opinion, does not conflict since there is no basis for 
determining the CA3's analysis. Of the remaining decisions, resp as-
serts ipse dixit that only Buckhalter arguably posses a conflict with 
the decision below. There is no reason to review that conflict be-
cause the AJ below was a hearing examiner in the employ of the very 
body accused of discrimination and was reviewed by the same body. 
With respect to§§ 1981 & 1983, resp argues that even fewer CA's have 
reviewed the issue. Resp then, somewhat cryptically, cites Zanghi v. 
Incorporated Village of Old Brookville and Moore v. Bonner with 
• 
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parentheticals indicating that perhaps they conflict. Resp's Brief at 
12 n.5. 
4. DISCUSSION: ~he issue of how res judicata principles ~pply in 
this area appears to be extremely important. It goes without saying 
that Title VII and §1983 claims are a significant part of the dockets 
of the USDC's. Ap~arently many states have administrative procedures 
for resolving employment discrimination and civil rights claims. 
Whether unreviewed administrative determinations reached in those pro-
ceedings block subsequent litigation in federal courts is an issue 
that presumably is often raised. Because of the clear circuit split 
on application of res judicata principles in these cases, I recommend 
a grant. 
Some of the cases petrs and the CA6 cite as cpnflicting could 
arguably be distinguished on the basis that they were decided before 
1982 and were therefore superceded by this Court's decision in Kremer. 
But even narrowing the field to the post-Kremer cases, a definite cir-
cuit split exists. The clearest evidence of this split is supplied by 
Burkhalter. The CA7 in Burkhalter parsed footnotes 7 and 26 of the 
Kremer opinion and reached the conclusion that the Court did not in-
tend allow relitigation of Title VII and §1983 claims already adjudi-
cated in state administrative proceedings but not reviewed in state 
courts. See 768 F.2d, at 854-855. That conclusion is directly at 
odds with the CA6's conclusions here. The result in Zanghi, supra, 
also conflicts with the CA6's result here, although Zanghi relies 
solely on Utah Construction and does not explicitly analyze Kremer. 
The CA6's decision also conflicts with the CA3's summary affirmance in 
O'Hara, although as resp points out it is difficult to distill a con-
- - 10 - -
flict out of a summary affirmance. The CA6's decision is supported 
but Garguil. The authoritativeness of Garguil is somewhat uncertain 
because of this Court's decision to GVR the decision in light of 
Migra. But the CA6 argues in its opinion below (persuasively in my 
view) that the GVR went only to the CA'2 conclusion that state court 
findings were not to be given preclusive effect since, after all, that 
was the issue posed in Migra. See App. at A24 n.9; see also Gargiul, 
704 F.2d, at 667. 
This case appears to be a good vehicle for resolving the split -because resp's complaint contains both Title VII claims and civil 
rights claims. Kremer involved Title VII claims alone and it is pos-
sible that different rules might apply to Title VII claims as opposed 
to other claims. Wright and Miller have commented: "It has been ruled 
that state administrative findings may establish preclusion as to the 
claims under these civil rights acts, at the same time as the same 
issues are relitigated as to the Title VII claim. The difficulties 
that will be encountered with this ·schizophrenic approach are obvious. 
A way out of these difficulties remains to be found." 18 Wright & 
Miller, at §4471, page 169 (1985 Supp.). 
One possible barrier to reaching the general res judicata issue 
raised in the petition is the factual question of whether the claims 
raised in resp's federal complaint were actually litigated in the 
state administrative proceedings. The AJ stated that resp "may not 
try his civil rights actions in this forum," Appendix at A45, but 
nonetheless considered some of the related issues raised as "affirma-
tive defenses." However, the factual issue of whether the claims 
raised in resp's federal complaint here were actually reviewed in the 
• 
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administrative proceedings is logically subsequent to the issue of 
whether claim preclusion principles apply at all and was treated as 
such by the CA6. It seems fairly clear, moreover, that at least some 
of the issues posed by resp's complaint were actually considered by 
the state AJ and would therefore be affected by a reversal of the 
CA6's decision. Therefore, this issue should be left for the CA6 on 
remand should the Court reverse the decision below. 
Another possible barrier to reaching the res judicata issue is 
whether the procedures provided by the administrative hearing comport 
with due process. Resp points out in his brief that the AJ was em-
ployed by the petrs in this case and suggests that res judicata prin-
ciples are therefore inapplicable. However, it is not clear that the 
procedures employed by Tennessee, which include a full panoply of pro-
cedural rights, violated due process guarantees. See Kremer, 456 
U.S., at 482-485 (upholding a state administrative procedure against 
Due Process challenge; noting "[w]e must bear in mind that no single 
model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of proce-
dure, is dictated by the Due Process Clause."). Moreover, this issue 
was apparently not pressed below and was not reached by the CA6. Ac-
cordingly, it poses no barrier to review of the general legal issue 
here and could also be left for the CA6 on remand should this Court 
reverse the decision below. 
There is a coincidental factual similarity between this case and 
United States v. Friday, No. 85-428 (cert. granted November 12, 1985) 
in that both involve allegations of racial discrimination in 4-H 
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programs in southern states. However, Friday not involve the issue 
posed here. 
There is a response 
I recommend grant. 
November 13, 1985 ~ assell Ops in petn 
- - November 27, 1985 Court ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 
85-588 
Submitted . ............... , 19 . . . Announced ............... . , 19 .. . 
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Question Presented 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Resp, a black, was a civil rights activist. Petr sought 
to have him fired, allegedly for inadequate performance. On Jan-
uary 14, 1982, resp filed suit in federal district court 
(W.D.Tenn.), alleging classwide racially discriminatory prac-
tices, actions taken in retaliation against resp because of his 
civil rights work, and actions directed against resp because of 
his race. Resp sought relief under 42 u.s.c. §§1981, 1983, 1985, 
and 1986 ("§1983"), and Title VII. The complaint named a number 
of defendants in addition to employees and agents of the Univer-
sity of Tennessee. 
~ 
The District Court entered a restraining on January 19, 
A 
1982, which it then dissolved on February 23, 1982, so that the 
University and resp could proceed through state administrative 
proceedings. These proceedings were conducted by a ~ earing exam-
"' 
iner sitting alone, between April and October 1982. In accord-
ance with State law, the examiner was an employee of the defend-
ant agency; he was also an employee of one of the defendants. 
None of the non-University defendants was represented or partici-
---------------------------------------------pated in the examination of witnesses. Under the procedure for 
these hearings, the University was to charge and prove that its 
desire to dismiss resp was justified. Although resp sought to 
introduce evidence of racial prejudice and discrimination, some 
of this evidence (perhaps most of it) was excluded on the ground 
that it belonged only in the federal action, and had no relevance 
to the issue of whether the University was justified in firing 
resp. 
• 
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After an arduous proceeding 
) 
(5000 pp.: 100+ witnesses), w~ , 
-----... 
the examiner determined that the University could not fire resp, .,. 
but recommended that resp be transferred to another geographic 
area so that he would work with a different person. 
The hearing examiner's order was appealed to the Univer-
-------------
sity, where a single officer affirmed it • That final order was ............., 
7 
'l I\ 
thus adopted as the agency decision. 
appealed to state court by any party. 
The final order was not /Y 
Resp filed a new motion in federal district court for a 
TRO, which included a number of claims that were not in the orig-
inal complaint. The District Judge ruled that the administrative 
hearing was res judiciata as to all claims raised in the com-
plaint • 
The Court of Appeals reversed. As for the Title VII 
claims, the court found that Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., 
456 U.S. 461 (1982), allowed litigation in federal court of Title 
VII claims because there had been no state court review of the 
judgment. The court also held that the §1983 claims were not 
precluded because §1738 ~does not require federal courts to defer -to unreviewed agency findings, and that common law principles of 
preclusion support providing a plaintiff a federal remedy. 
II. DISCUSSION 
St, 
This is a close case. I am troubled by the waste of ~ 
9 
relitigating in federal courts claims that have already been run 
through a state administrative proceeding (I recognize in this 
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Nevertheless, it appears that the SG and resp are correct in ar-
guing that neither Title VII claims nor §1983 claims are entitled 
to _ preclu~ e_--31 
affirm CA6. 
t. I therefore recommend that you vote to 
Resp starts by arguing that there should be no preclu-
in this case because resp was denied a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate all of his allegations of race discrimination, 
thus all of his claims under §1983 and Title VII were not decided 
by the agency. I would not consider the case on this ground. It 
.---,. --is not the issue before the court. It was not considered by 
--------~ 
either of the lower courts. It has no applicability outside this 
And it relies on a record that is not properly ~ particular case. 




I agree with your conclusion that both the spirit of 
Kremer and footnote seven of that opinion support the Sixth Cir-r ...,__ 
cuit's result concerning preclusion of Title VII claims. Title 
VII contemplates a ' t wo-step adjudication of claim~~ the plaintiff 
------- -------------------enters state administrative proceedings and then may move into 
the federal forum. Moreover, despite the initial appeal of 
petr's "only-one-bite-at-the-apple" argument (especially in a 
case with 5000 pages of record), the SG is ultimately correct i n 
asserting that petr 's position would "increase the workload of 
the federal courts and the EEOC" because many claims that might 
have been settled after state administrative review would instead 
go directly into federal court. 
v"Uni ted States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 
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struction concerned res judiciata for factual determinations by a 
federal agency under a specific statutory regime, the Wunderlich 
Act. Id., at 421 n. 18. It does not have the implications for 
all "judicial-like" state agency determinations. 
I also believe that CA6 correctly decided th 
issue. The statute on its face does not require federal courts 
.r-z_ -
to defer to the unreviewed finding of state administrative agen-- ~ ---------------
~ Nor does any language in Court cases indicate that federal 
courts should so defer. Petr's arguments on this matter hinge on 
the assumption, [incorrectly] drawn from Utah Construction, that 
state agency determinations are here equivalent to state judicial 
proceedings once the agency uses a certain number of procedural 
safeguards • 
I( 
I further agree with CA6's determination that nothing in 
, ... - · common law requires the application of preclusion. In a nut-
--------------------------------
shell, CA6, citing to Court precedent, recognized that the pur-
pose for the passage of §1983 was deprivations of civil rights at 
the hands of the states, and therefore it was important to pro-
vide a federal remedy in a federal court, with federal process, 
federal factfinding, and a life-tenured judge. This "common law" 
does not support application of preclusion. In fact, preclusion 
would undermine an essential purpose of §1983. 
III. RECOMMENDATION 
I recommend that you vote to affirm the judgment of CA6. ~ 







April 10, 1986 
TENN GINA-POW 
85-588 University of Tennessee v. Elliott 
Memo to Cabell: 
~ 
This case appears to present a straight forward 
question that apparently we granted to resolve a conflict. 
Respondent, a black employee of the University, was 
discharged for alleged inadquate job performance and 
misconduct. He first resorted to state administrative 
remedies under 
Procedures Act. 
the Tennessee Uniform Administrative 
This provides a public employee with an 
administrative review of a discharge. Shortly thereafter, 
respondent filed suit against the University and various 
officials in the United States District Court, alleging a 
violation of Title VII. The respondent also raised other 
federal civil rights claims under §1983 et seq. The DC 
stayed federal action pending the outcome of the state 
administrative challenge . 
A state administrative law judge conducted extensive 
hearings, sustained several of the University's claims of 
improper and inadequate performance by respondent, and 
further held that respondent had "failed in his burden of 
proving the claim of racial discrimination as a defense to 
• 
-
the charges against him." 




The ALJ concluded, however, 
transferred rather than 
In accord with Tennessee law, respondent then 
requested review by the appropriate University of 
Tennessee official. That official, a Vice President of 
the University, agreed with the AlJ's ruling. Neither 
petitioners nor respondents exercised their statutory 
right under the Tennessee Code to seek state court relief. 
Thereupon, respondent renewed his federal court 
action. Petitioners responded by moving for summary 
judgment, arguing that under principles of res judicata 
the state administrative finding of no discrimination 
precluded respondent's Title VII claims. The DC agreed, 
holding that the state administrative finding should be 
given preclusion effect under principles of res judicata. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that such 
principles did not bar the Title VII action. The Court of 
Appeals relied on this Court's decision in Kramer v. 
Olemical Construction Corportation, 456 U.S. 461, that 
"drew a sharp distinction between state court judgments 
which are entitled to deference under the res judicata 
• 
• 
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principles of 28 u.s.c 1738, and unreviewed state 
administrative determinations which are not". 
I have taken a look at Kramer, and am inclined to 
agree that CA6 was correct. Kramer involved a situation 
where the complaining employee, after losing before the 
state administrative agency, appealed his claim - as New 
York State law permitted - to the State Supreme Court 
(Appellate Division). This court held, as the SG's brief 
emphasizes, that our cases have repeatedly held that a 
state court final judgment is entitled to res judicata 
effect in a federal court • 
This case is different in that respondent did not 
appeal the adverse decision of the state administrative 
agency to the Tennessee Courts, as he had a right to do. 
Although Kramer did not involve this precise quest i on, its 
rationale seems to foreclose the application of res 
judicata in the absence of a state court decision. In 
Kramer, 476 U.S. at 470, n. 7, we said: 
"Nor is it plausible to suggest that 
Congress intended federal courts to be bound 
further by state administrative decisions than 
by decisions of the EEOC. Since it is settled 
that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a 
trial de novo in federal court, it is clear that 
unreviewed administrative determinations by 
state agencies also should not preclude such 
review even if such a decision were to be 
• 
- -
afforded preclusive effect in a state's own 
courts." 
4. 
Despite the arguments that are made rather well in 
the state's brief, apparently written by professors at the 
University of Tennessee, and subject to a closer look at 
some of our other cases, I am inclined to th ink that 
Kramer controls as the SG states. Of course, the 
language in the footnote quoted above is dicta, and yet it 
comports with the rationale of the Court's decision in 
Kramer • 
* * * 
If my clerk does not have a different view, a two or 




85-588 UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE v. ELLIOTT Argued 4/21/86 
• 
~J ~ 0-J 
~ ~ ~ -f???~ --, 
~ -rr-z-t /?1h1f p'7-/~ ~fl (VJ 
. ~ ·-vvn,,r J 
o/ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~
., ~? ~ ~~-~~ -./1 
~'"IJ P .,1Jia#!.--p{•~~ 
~ -~o/~,, •~,4??/~~,~~ 7~ 
;h7V~f?~/ ~ •~p ~r"7,,s.) • 
117-, 1'71 '7_L ~ fr?~~ -I-~ 
- fS>'j --z-rr7 · ~ ~~ 
~,~~ M~ 7,os 
. b  ~ 
__ .J' ~ ,..,,.,. :-PP l 2 /? I ~ ;;;-rt ' "' 0-W, , 
ry~ Z. ,~.,_.? ~ /-,,~ 
/1?1 1;)-f ?..l ~ ~ ,-y -rT'J,,-4~ -ii!"~~ f 
01' ---z.-.p ~~ s,M{/~ ?-TS: ,!JJ,-






~ '7' ~ ~~ -f _, ,-i; ~ /- ' 
--,...--: ~ ~.";'!$' ~~~/~~ --177;,J 
3/2/~77.£ ' E✓bl~~9l{y 
-~ 
.JI:i~_L~?~r,t_ n-t oG ~-n~~~ 
--,lo ?0~7..q ~ ~71~~ 
~ ( 717'_ ~~ ~ ~-?-I~~ 
~I,'!?~ ~s- 0-/' -I~ 5 . ·~1 'o/~~ 
~ ~ ~ , {r/ c/ 2i ~ 
·-n7 ~v 
~~>'~(17 ~-1~ 6) -~ 
~ ~~. ~?~ ~ ~/ • ~$ 
~~ ~ ·~ .-v o-r --Ptr/-h 
~--~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~
-~ ;1 ?14 -1, ~ ~~?+~ ~ 
,, -17~, 7 ~ b ~ ~r'7 .. ~~ -ry 
~ (FAS ~ ~ ;;>,CJ s ~ ~-fll'Y/ 
' ·s ~~ ~ ~ ~ 3 'i.l/ i 
(-~)~ 
-
- • Ko. 85-588 University of Tennessee v. Elliott Conf. 4/23/86 
The Chief Justice ~ ~ 
~;<~~~I-'-'-~ 
1-v j~~~- ~J)-{,..hL< •• ~~~ 
ft..,._;L ~ ,,._• ,,..,,_,o ,........,_ tr""' • ,_.,, < ,,._I; ,n.....,,_;f a., I ( 'rl-,b 
11.,;H-t, -v,,: ~ ~ ~,, ur c , ~ 4::, a_., ~ 
~f-. 
(Cf cL....R ~t ~~ ~ 11g3) 
',( " '-I 
Gf'4v ~~~v- C ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ '~ \,\ P)AJ H,,J., 14 f ~ ~ ~ , 
Justice Brennan q+/:~ 
~ wJ;,/A; L, i . 
Justice White ~ tlJ---z., ,4, /t-~ 'IJ_j_J_ ~  ~ /7~. 
8J ~~ /(~ ~ ~/1-,/-(.t,QE_ 
;:$, s ~l w a.. ~ l1tf3 ~~""~ ; ~~.4/b~A-4 
f.o 0f:. ---
~~ .tA- >4 P-~~~~~ 
' 
{~~~-k 
-~f- 9 ~~ ... /,,_4r 1~ 
~ /3 "<hi /-2a11-;_~-tvl.~ 
~ 9 ;...... ~ J.., ~ ) 
-~~-1~~~~·~ 
~~ o-t ~~ ~ )HJ . ~7 
-~ 'r? -~ ~f-r?~-1 °1 
~ () ~ ~ ~ ~ ~d 
. ~ £t:fb/~ ;;?~~ 
~~ (r1--V~  ~ 177 
~- C"?V1 9 (yJ ~ 0--,, M{IV 
~ ~ ~::> F '£'" 5 !, l [ o-; ~ 
~ °7 ~ ~ ~ ~ /f 
~ [1/i __ 'rf .:_I ~ ~-11o na,\-\Od a;,qsnr 
- • 
- • . . 
. • Justice Rehnquist L2f-) ~ 4-t. k rLil... ~ t l ~ 
~~ 4J ~~ ~ I<;, F .:J - ---, 
.., ~ ~ ~ t>-1-, ,_.,. ~,, f&<:::::/r-q, 
~ - ~~~.b--<._ ~ 
~ ~ ~~ 
Justice Stevens Oj.f-~ ..A-1.- /.o /{.., 1-l,_ !i.L, 
~ 7 l~Y::J d~.,,._ ~ /4f-/--<-~,Lf-'i- ~--
~ 1/l,J._ W~~~~~G(~ 
~ ~) ~ ,..~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ ~~ 
-5~ ~ ~  ~ ~ 1-~ 6--
,,,_~I ]( . ,,_j-~-- ---4'> ,_,_1: /3 c,._/--
~f ~ rZ.4 ~ ~ 0~ J 
Justice O'Connor t:2-j-/.A.u..- ~ /..o Tt..,,/-l,, u I, ,,; ~ ~ /.7a.,.,.f ~£i;~ 
~ l~T?. 
· J 173? £a_,-v,u_g-f-~ ~ .; lfT'3 
L ~ . ~ ~ -h_. ~ £,4"-r-~ 
~ 
~ ~ 4 ~~ ~ 




" - llllifiF The _Chief Justice -/7 rf_. (f • J ust1ce Brennan v.__,. 7 - · Justice Marshall 
t'.bt-4 ru/&.~~ -· 
13/?w ~  
~ r ~ ~ ~ -~
Pj,6----g~W4-- · 
~ w C, f-.  - 1 







From: Justice White 
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Recirculated: _ ________ _ 
~ ~ REME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~ 
s-)2-& 
~ _. q) LD No. 85-588 
~ UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
( S -'2-,e:._ ~ v. ROBERT B. ELLIOTT 
~ . /-f) ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1986) 
G ~) 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A state administrative law judge determined that peti-
tioner was not motivated by racial prejudice in seeking to dis-
charge respondent. The question presented is whether this 
finding is entitled to preclusive effect in federal court, where 
respondent has raised discrimination claims under under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e 
et seq. (as amended), and other civil rights laws. 
I 
In 1981, petitioner University of Tennessee informed re-
spondent, a black employee of the University's Agricultural 
Extension Service, that he would be discharged for inade-
quate work performance and misconduct on the job. Re-
spondent requested a hearing under the Tennessee Uniform 
Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101 
et seq., to contest his proposed termination. Prior to the 
commencement of the administrative proceedings, respond-
ent also filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Tennessee, alleging that his proposed 
discharge was racially motivated and seeking relief under 
Title VII and other civil rights statutes, including 42 
' - -
85-588-OPINION 
2 UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE v. ELLIOTT 
U. S. C. § 1983. 1 The relief sought included damages, an in-
junction prohibiting respondent's discharge, and classwide 
relief for alleged patterns of discrimination by petitioner. 
The District Court initially entered a temporary restrain-
ing order prohibiting the University from taking any job ac-
tion against respondent, but later lifted this order and per-
mitted the state administrative proceeding to go forward. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 27. There followed a hearing at which 
an administrative assistant to the University's Vice Presi-
dent for Agriculture presided as an administrative law judge 
(ALJ). The focus of the hearing was on ten particular 
charges which the University gave as grounds for respond-
ent's discharge. Respondent denied these charges, which he 
contended were motivated by racial prejudice, and also ar-
gued that the University's subjecting him to the charges vio-
lated his rights under the Constitution, Title VII, and other 
federal statutes. The ALJ held that he lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate respondent's federal civil rights claims, but did 
allow respondent to present, as an affirmative defense, evi-
dence that the charges against him were actually motivated 
by racial prejudice and hence unfounded. Id., at 44-45. 
After hearing extensive evidence,2 the ALJ found that the 
University had proved some but not all oftliecharges agamst 
respon~rrt-; and 1naf tne charges~ were not raciall moti-
vatecr:-- / d., at 177-179. Conclm mg at the proposed dis-
cfiarge of respondent was too severe a penalty, the ALJ or-
dered him transferred to a new assignment with supervisors 
other than those with whom he had experienced conflicts. 
Id., at 179-181. Respondent appealed the ALJ's ruling to 
the University's Vice President for Agriculture, who af-
' Respondent's complaint also included claims under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 
1985, 1986, and 1988, as well as the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. App. 17. 
2 The hearing continued intermittently for more than five months, in-
volved more than 100 witnesses and 150 exhibits, and generated over 5,000 
pages of transcript. App. to. Pet. for Cert. 27. 
- -
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firmed the ruling as supported by the evidence, and stated 
that his review of the record persuaded him that the pro-
posed discharge of respondent had not been racially moti-
vated. Id., at 33- 35 . 
Respondent did not seek review of these administrative 
proceed0gs in the Tennessee courts, in~g to 
federal court to ursue his c1v1 rights claims. There, peti-
tioner mcYVettror~enfon--tfie ground that re-
spondent's suit was an improper collateral attack on the 
ALJ's ruling, which petitioner contended was entitled to pre-
elusive effect. The ,Pe' agreed, holding that the civil rights : District Cour t 
statutes on which respondent relied "were not intended to 
allow the plaintiff a means of relitigating what plaintiff has 
heretofore litigated over a five-month period." Id., at 32. 
Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the District 
Court's judgment. 766 F. 2d 982 (1985). As regards re-
spondent's Title VII claim, the Court of Appeals looked for 
guidance to our decision in Kremer v. Chemical Construction 
Co., 456 U. S. 461 (1982). 3 While Kremer teaches that final 
~
st~ c~~~ts a~ entitled to full faith and credit in 
Title VU actions, it indicates that unreviewed determina-
tions by state agencies stand on a different footing: The 
Sixth e fo owing p ssa emer di-
3 In Kremer, an employee filed a Title VII discrimination charge with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-5 referred the case to the New York State Division of 
Human Rights, the agency charged with administering the State's employ-
ment discrimination laws. The State agency rejected the employee's dis-
crimination claim, a judgment that was affirmed both at the agency appel-
late level and by a reviewing state court. The employee then brought a 
Title VII action, in which the employer raised a res judicata defense. This 
Court held that under 28 U. S. C. § 1738 the State court's judgment affirm-
ing the State agency's finding of no discrimination was entitled to preclu-
sive effect in the employee's ';I'itle VII action. 
- -
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"EEOC review [pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 2000e-5(b)] of 
discrimination charges previously rejected by state 
agencies would be pointless if the federal courts were 
bound by such agency decisions. Batiste v. Furnco 
Constr. Corp., 503 F. 2d 447, 450, n. 1(CA71974), cert. 
denied, 420 U. S. 928 (1975). Nor is it plausible to sug-
gest that Congress intended federal courts to be bound 
further by state administrative decisions than by deci-
sions of the EEOC. Since it is settled that decisions by 
the EEOC do not preclude a trial de nova in federal 
court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative deter-
minations by state agencies also should not preclude such 
review even if such a decision were to be afforded preclu-
sive effect in a State's own courts. Garner v. 
Giarrusso, 571 F. 2d 1330 (CA5 1978), Batiste v. Furnco 
Constr. Corp., supra; Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 
452 U. S. 889 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 918 
(1972)." 456 U. S., at 470, n. 7. 
' 28 U. S. C. § 1738 provides in pertinent part: 
"The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any ... State, Ter-
ritory or Possession [of the United States], or copies thereof, shall be 
proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Terri-
tories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court 
annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court 
that the said attestation is in proper form. 
"Such ... records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authen-
ticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or 
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federal courts be bound by the unreviewed findings of state 
administrative agencies. The court also declined to fashion a 
federal common law of preclusion, declaring that "[a]t least 
implicit in the legislative history of section 1983 is the recog-
nition that state determination of issues relevant to constitu-
tional adjudication is not an adequate substitute for full ac-
cess to federal court." 766 F. 2d, at 992. The court 
recognized that a similar argument for denying res judicata 
effect to state court judgments in subsequent § 1983 actions 
was rejected in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980), and 
Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 
-- U. S. -- (1984), but distinguished those cases as 
based on the explicit command of § 1738. 
We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's contention 
that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that state adminis-
trative factfinding is never entitled to preclusive effect in 
§ 1983 or other civil rights actions. -- U. S. -- (1985). 
II 
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be 
given the judgments and records of state courts, and is not -applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfinding 
at issue in this case. o ever, ve requently fash- 1 
ione~mon-law rules of preclusion in the absence 
of a governing statute. See, e. g., Parklane Hosiery Co., 
Inc. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 
313 (1971); Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State 
Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Stall v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 
(1938); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U. S. 273, 289-291 
(1906). Accordingly, we will consider whether a rule of pre-
clusion is appropriate, first with respect to respondent's Title 
VII claim, and next with respect to his claims under the Re-
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III 
Under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(b), the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in investigating dis-
crimination charges, must give "substantial weight to final 
findings and orders made by State or local authorities in pro-
ceedings commenced under State or local [employment dis-
crimination] law." As we noted in Kremer, supra, at 470, 
n. 7, it would make little sense for Congress to write such a 
provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive 
effect in Title VII actions in federal court. 
Moreover, our decision in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 
U. S. 840 (1976), strongly supports respondent's contention 
that Congress intended one in his position to ~ave a tri<!Lde. 
nova on his Title YlI..G!.aim. In Chandler, we eld that a fed-
era~ose 'discrimination claim was rejectecfby 
h~employing agency after an administrative hearing was 
entitled to a trial de nova in federal court on her Title VII 
claim. After reviewing in considerable detail the language 
of Title VII and the history of the 1972 amendments to the 
statute, we concluded: 
"The legislative history of the 1972 amendments rein-
forces the plain meaning of the statute and confi_rms that 
Congress intended to accord 'federal employeei the same 
ri~ovo o owing a mm1s rat1ve proceed-
ings] as is enjoyed by private-sector employees and em-
ployees of state ·governments and political subdivisions 
under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id., at 
848. 
Like the plaintiff in Chandler, the respondent in this case 
pursued his Title VII action following an administrative pro-
ceeding at which the employing agency rejected a discrimina-
tion claim. It would be contrary to the rationale of Chandler 
to deny respondent a trial de nova on his Title VII claim. 
Invoking the presumpti~nst implied repeal, peti-
tioner distinguishes Chandler as involving a federal agency 
- -
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determination not entitled to full faith and credit under 
§ 1738. Reply Brief for Petitioner 16. This argument is 
based on the erroneous premise that § 1738 applies to state 
administrative proceedings. See Part II, supra. The ques-
tion actually before us is whether a common-law rule of pre-
clusion would be consistent with Congress's intent in enact-
ing Title VII. On the basis of our analysis in Kremer and 
Chandler of the language and legislative history of Title VII, 
we conclude that the Sixth Circuit correctly held that Con-
gress did not intend unreviewed state administrative pro-
ceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims. 5 
IV 
This Court has held that § 1738 requires that state court 
judgpients be ·ven both issue and~ preclusive effect in 
subs~ns under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. '11 llen v. 
McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980) (issue preclusion); Migra v. 
Warren City _,$.chool District Board of Education, -- U. S. 
-- (1984) fclaim preclusion). Those decisions are not con-
trolling in this c~e, where § 1738 does nos a£Ply; nonethe-
l~s, they support the vlew that Congi:ess, in enacting the 
Reconstruct10n c1v1 rig ts statutes, did not intend to create 
an exception to general rules of preclusion. As we statea in 
Allen, 
"[N]othing in the language of § 1983 remotely ex-
presses any congressional intent to contravene the com-
mon-law rules of preclusion or to repeal the express stat-
utory requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1738 .... 
"Moreover, the legislative history of§ 1983 does not in 
any clear way suggest that Congress intended to repeal 
5 The fact that respondent requested the administrative hearing rather 
than being compelled to participate in it does not weigh in favor of preclu-
sion. "[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional in-
tent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both 
Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes." Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. ~- 36, 48 (1974)(footnote omitted). 
) 
I~ 
~ ~ ~ 
- -
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or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion." 449 
U. S., at 97-98. 
The Court's discussion in Allen suggests that it would have 
reached the same result even in the absence of § 1738. We 
also se no reason to su pose that Congress, in enacting the 
Reconstruction civil rig ts s atu es, w1s ed to foreclose the 
adaptation of traditional principles of preclusion to sucli sub-
se uent dev opmen s as e urge~ of adminis-
trative ad·udication in the twentiethcen ry. -----.» 
We previously ave recognize that it is sound policy to 
apply principles of issue preclusion to the factfinding of ad-
ministrative bodi~ acting in a judicial capacity. In a unani-
mous decision in'1Jnited States v. Utah Construction Co., 384 
U. S. 394 (1966), we held that the factfinding of the Advisory 
Board of Contract Appeals was binding in a subsequent ac-
tion in the Court of Claims involving a contract dispute be-
tween the same parties. We explained: 
"Although the decision here rests upon the contract of 
the parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act, we note 
that the result we reach is harmonious with general prin-
ciples of collateral estoppel. Occasionally courts have 
used language to the effect that res judicata principles 
do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such lan-
guage is certainly too broad. . . . When an adminis-
trative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and re-
solves disputed issues of fact properly before it which 
the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, 
the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to en-
force repose." Id., at 421-422 (1966) (footnotes and cita-
tions omitted). 
Thus, Utah Construction, which we subsequently approved 
in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., supra, at 484, 
n. 26, teaches that giving preclusive effect to administrative 
factfinding serves the value underlying general principles of 
- -
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collateral estoppel: enforcing repose. 6 This value, which en-
compasses both the parties' interest in avoiding the cost and 
vexation of repetitive litigation and the public's interest in 
conserving judicial resources, Allen v. McCurry, supra, at 
94, is equally implicated whether factfinding is done by a fed-
eral or state agency. 
Having federal courts give preclusive effect to the 
factfinding of state administrative tribunals also serves the 
value of federalism. Significantly, all of the opinions in 
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U. S. 261 (1980), 
express the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause com-
pels the States to give preclusive effect to the factfindings of 
an administrative tribunal in a sister State. Id., at 281 
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); 287-289 (WHITE, J., concurring in 
judgment); 291-292 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause is of course not binding on federal 
courts, but we can certainly look to the policies underlying 
the Clause in fashioning federal common-law rules of preclu-
sion. "Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause is to act as a national unifying force," id, at 289 
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment), and this purpose is 
6 As one respected authority on administrative law has observed: 
"The law of res judicata, much more than most other segments of law, 
has rhyme, reason, and rhythm-something in common with good poetry. 
It's inner logic is rather satisfying. It consists entirely on an elaboration 
of the obvious principle that a controversy should be resolved once, not 
more than ·once. The principle is as much needed for administrative deci-
sions as for other judicial decisions. To the extent that administrative ad-
judications resemble courts' decisions-a very great extent-the law 
worked out for courts does and should apply to agencies." Davis, 4 Ad-
ministrative Law Treatise § 21.9, at 78. 
The Restatement of Judgments (Second) (1982), reaches a similar 
conclusion: 
"Where an administrative forum has the essential procedural charac-
teristics of a court, ... its determinations should be accorded the same fi-
nality that is accorded the judgment of a court. The importance of bring-
ing a legal controversy to conclusion is generally no less when the tribunal 
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served by giving preclusive effect to state administrative 
factfinding rather than leaving the courts of a second forum, 
state or federal, free to reach conflicting results. 7 Accord--iugly, we hold that when a state agency "acting in a judicial 
capacity .=: . resolves dis uted 1ss~es of fact ro erl before 
itwliich the pa 1es ave ad an adequate opportunity to liti-
g ate," Utah Construction, supra, at 422, federal court§..!!}ust 
give the a ency's factfindin the same reclusive effect to 
wh1c 1t wou entit ed in the State s cou s. 
e ju gment o the Cou o ppea s 1s affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, and the case remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the 
c onsideration or decision of this case. 
7 Congress of course may decide, as it did in enacting Title VII, that 
other values outweigh the policy of according finality to state adminis-
trative factfinding. See Part III , supra. 
a Respondent argues against preclusion on the grounds that the adminis-
trative hearing in this case did not satisfy the standard set out in Utah 
Construction, Brief for Respondent 39-76, and that the ALJ's factfinding 
would not be given preclusive effect in the Tennessee courts , id., at 
99-105. These contentions were not passed upon below, and we leave 
them for resolution on remand. 
- -
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TENN GINA-POW 
85-588 University of Tennessee v. Elliott 
Memo to Cabell: 
I have reviewed Justice White's first draft in this 
case. As to the Title VII claim, he holds that an 
administrative decision does not foreclose the right of a 
Title VII claimant to a de novo federal court review. 
That is, there is no preclusion. 
Conference. 
This was my vote at 
As to Section 1983, Justice White, relying on the 
cases cited in Part IV of his opinion (p.7-10), concludes 
that "when a state agency 'acting in a judicial capacity 
•.• resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it, 
which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to 
litigate', Utah Construction at 422, federal courts must 
give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect 
to which it would be entitled in state courts." P. 10. 
Although I have not reviewed your bench memo, I do 
not think we focused on Utah Construction to the extend 
Justice White does. In view of my views as to importance 
of federalism, I like BRW's decision. 
- - 2. 
After you have given me a second draft of your Court 
opinion, you might put this case on your list. You do not 
need to write a memo, but I would like your views. 
LFP,JR. 
I - -i\uprmtt <!f!tlttt of tlf t ~b .lltaue-)Tu1pngton. ~. <!f. 2llffe>!' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
May 28, 1986 
Re: 85-588 - University of Tennessee v. Elliott 
Dear Byron: 
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June 4, 198 6 
No. 85-588 University of Tennessee v. Elliott 
Dear Byron, 
I join your opinion in this case, but I ~uld 
appreciate your considering adding a sentence just before 
the last sentence of Part II along the following lines: 
"Although §1738 is a governing statute with regard to the 
judgments and records of state courts, because §1738 
antedates the developnent of administrative agencies it 
clearly does not represent a congressional determination 
that the decisions of state administrative agencies should 
not be given preclusive effect." 
Justice White 
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Dear Byron: 
Please join me . 
Justice White 
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June 25, 1986 
Re: No. 85-588, University of Tennessee v. Elliott 
Dear John: 
~ 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
Justice Stevens 






.;§upuuu (!fourl of ut~ ~h ~hdtg 
Jhudp:nghm. ~. (!f. 211~~, 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN June 25, 1986 
Re: No. 85-588, University of Tennessee v. Elliott 
Dear Byron: 
V 
I am joining John in this case and thereby join Parts I, 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMl5ERS OF" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, JR. 
• -
i\n:prmtt QI.onrl .of flrt 'Jni!tb jbdts 
Jlulpnghm. ~- QI. 21l~'l, 
July 2, 1986 
No. 85-588 
University of Tennessee v. Elliott 
Dear Byron and John, 
I intended to write separately in this case 
in order to express my concern that the Court had 
too quickly resorted to its common law powers 
without considering whether Sl738 left us any such 
power. After considering several drafts, I have 
now concluded that the opinion "will not write." 
I therefore add my vote to John's opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I'm 
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85-588 University of Tennessee v. Elliott (Cabell) 
BRW for the Court 5/5/86 
1st draft 5/22/86 
2nd draft 6/5/86 
3rd draft 6/16/86 
4th draft 6/16/86 
5th draft 6/20/86 




JPS concurring in part and dissenting in part 
1st draft 6/24/86 
2nd draft 6/26/86 
3rd draft 6/27/86 
Joined by HAB 6/25/86 
WJB 7/2/86 
TM out 6/5/86 
5. 
